The Pakistani Spectator

Most of the major suicide bombings carried out in Pakistan since 9/11, including the twin suicide hits in Lahore on September 1, killing over 30 people, have a common grandmother — the al-Qaeda-linked Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) — a sectarian turned Jihadi organisation, which is the group of choice for hardcore Pakistani militants who are adamant to pursue their anti-shia and anti-American Jihadi agenda.

Terrorism experts believe that there is hardly any difference between the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (the Army of Jhangvi) and theLashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Aalmi (International), which has already claimed responsibility for the twin suicide attacks in Lahore. While Akram Lahori, already languishing in a Karachi jail, is the Salar-e-Aaala of the LeJ, the Al-Aalmi is a predominantly Punjab-based faction and headed by Abdullah Mansoor, who is based in Waziristan. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi uses terror tactics as part of its grand strategy to force the state into accepting its narrow interpretations of the Sunni sectarian doctrines as official doctrines. Besides targeting American interests in Pakistan, the victims of its terror tactics have been leaders and workers of rival Shia outfits, bureaucrats, policemen and worshippers.

Launched in 1996 as a Sunni sectarian group, the Lashkar today has deep links with al-Qaeda and Taliban and is considered to be the most violent terrorist organisation, operating in Pakistan with the help of its lethal suicide squad. As with most Sunni sectarian and militant groups, almost the entire LeJ leadership is made up of people who have fought in Afghanistan and most of its cadre strength has been drawn from the numerous Sunni Madrassas in Pakistan.

Besides receiving sanctuary from the Taliban in Afghanistan for their terrorist activities in Pakistan, the LeJ operatives used to fight alongside the Taliban militants. Being part of the broader Deoband movement, the LeJ secured considerable assistance from other Deobandi outfits. The LeJ also has an effectual working relationship with other Deobandi religio-political and terrorist organisations at a personal level, if not at the organisational level. Also, Pakistani intelligence findings show that al-Qaeda has been involved with training of the LeJ members, and that the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants also fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance troops in Afghanistan. According to the Pakistani intelligence findings, the LeJ first established links to al-Qaeda soon after the Osama-led terror group headquartered itself in Afghanistan in the late 1990s.

The LeJ was long al-Qaeda’s principal ally, years before the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban phenomenon within roughly the last five years. After the 2001 Western invasion of Afghanistan, the LeJ returned to Pakistan’s northwest tribal areas along with its al-Qaeda allies and assisted in al-Qaeda’s relocation to Pakistan. The LeJ militants later sought to exploit the 2003-2004 Pakistani military operation in South Waziristan to convince Pashtun tribal Jihadi elements in northwestern Pakistan at the time focused on fighting in Afghanistan to join forces in rebellion against Islamabad. This culminated in the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan-led insurgency that began in 2006, with the LeJ serving as a significant nexus between al-Qaeda and the TTP. The Punjabi militants of LeJ, an important segment within the Punjabi Taliban landscape, in fact played a critical role in founding the TTP, with key TTP leader and a close associate of the slain TTP founder Baitullha Mehsud, Qari Hussain Mehsud, also known as Ustad-e-Fidayeen, having come from the LeJ.

Terrorism experts say the Lashkar has become media-savvy and times daylight terror attacks to catch the evening news. They believe the planners of the terror attacks watch Hollywood films for ideas. And that is how they thought of disguising the late LeJ chief, Riaz Basra, putting his leg in a cast and wheeling him into former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Lahore residence in 1998 as part of a scheme to show that the LeT hit men could infiltrate anywhere. Another idea came from a famous Bollywood movie: the LeJ organised a fake wedding procession in Multan district of the Punjab in 1997, with a bridegroom on a white horse accompanied by musicians, singers and dancers. A cameraman kept recording the event. As the noisy convoy passed the heavily guarded Iranian Cultural Center, hit men climbed over the back wall and shot dead the Center’s Iranian director and six others. Fireworks set off by the wedding guests camouflaged the gunfire.

While the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi obviously takes some directions from the al-Qaeda, the terror group stays focused on its home turf and its stated goal of radicalising Pakistan. The stakes in that battle are far from parochial. In addition to its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan is a key strategic ally of the US in its War on Terror. Most terrorism experts agree that the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi operatives are the most highly trained and equally vicious killers the world of terror has to offer. Media reports, quoting intelligence sources, say the Lashkar has finally moved to centre stage, and the past claims by Pakistani agencies of its demise after the capture of the LeJ chief Akram Lahori have proved to be wide off the mark, keeping in view the growing number of suicide attacks being conducted by the LeJ, mainly targeting the Shias as well as the western installations.

Courtesy News