The Pakistani Spectator

The Libyan President Muammar Qadafi addressing the 64th session of the UN General Assembly rightly pointed out that the use of veto in Security Council by the Permanent 5 has lost its validity long ago and in large it has been exercised against the very principles of the UN Charter. Similar viewpoints have been shown by number of other non P-5 heads of the states in their individual addresses to the UNGA over the years that the veto power of the Permanent Five (P-5) which constitutes the very essence of the United Nations mechanism in large has reflected on the impartial and democratic nature of the institution. There is no equality of rights of the member states. The five countries which reaped the fruits of victory in World War II were accorded special privileges. David Schweigman, a UN expert discusses in his book The Authority of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that the voting in the Security Council on procedural and non-procedural patterns has marked the uneven division of powers between the permanent and non-permanent members.

There has been no mention of the Veto in the UN Charter. The use of veto is the ultimate result of have and have-nots power division of the use of affirmative and concurring vote of the UNSC on procedural and non-procedural matters.  Article 27 of the UN Charter says: “ i. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. ii.  Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, iii. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”.

The use of power is a privilege and responsibility of P-5 allowed in the hands of major powers for the promotion of international peace and security by preventing any move or resolution which could threaten the very principle of the United Nations.  Nevertheless,  its use has been negated in spirit due to uneven division of the use of powers on procedural and non procedural matters.

One can cite number of examples when the use of veto being in negation of the UN Charter and international law was exercised to support power politics and regional interference for national interests. For example, when two resolutions were tabled in Security Council reproving the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and  taking American diplomats as hostages by Iranians in 1980 the USSR immediately vetoed them one after another.

Matters included in the procedural list or discussed are very limited without being significance. For example, the putting on any country’s request for UN membership by Security Council is procedural matter and does need concurring vote, but the approval of 9 members including concurring of P-5 is non-procedural (absentia is allowed).  Thus in August 1972 Security Council succeeded in tabling the resolution for membership of Bangladesh as it was procedural but China vetoed it on 25 August 1972 as non procedural matter. Also, in case of any dispute whether the item is procedural or non-procedural the matter is treated as non procedural where affirmative vote of the P-5 is applicable by limiting the role of non-permanent members is rather limited in procedural matters, because they don’t have the right of concurring vote.  Had they had been assigned the right of concurring vote  in non-procedural matters, the Security Council might not have been heavily dominated by the permanent members as it is today.   Giulio Terzi, the Italy’s UN Ambassador has rightly remarked that no matter the use or threat of the use of veto, the ‘hidden veto’ has prevented substantial discussions of questions that are crucial to international peace and security.

A total of 261 vetoes (1946-2009) have been used in the Security Council with the following frequency: USSR/Russia 123, US 82, UK 32, France 18, China 6 (including one by Republic of China or Taiwan against the application for admission of Mongolia in UN). The use of veto against the admissions of new states in the UN was very frequent in 1950s and 1960s.  The absolute majority of them were exercised by the USSR which blocked the admission until next. Many countries with excellent democratic record such as Finland, Italy, and Japan were blocked by USSR.  The Great Britain and France never used veto to block an admission to the UN. Since 1976 there has been no use of veto against the application of admission for UN membership. America did not use its veto power as the foreign policy options or state behavior until 1970. There had been occasions when it should have used the veto for the enhancement of world peace and security. In many strategists’ analysis US could use its right of veto on a number of sensitive and strategic issues such as Arab-Israel dispute in 1956, Jordan River dispute and Arab-Israel War 1967 either in support of Israel against Arabs or uphold the UN charter. Since then it has dominantly exercised it in favor of Israeli role in the Middle East in violation of UN Charter as its strategic liability with unyielding support. In 1970 the US exercised its first veto on November 1970 on the situation in South Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). On Sept. 10 1972 US exercised its second but first veto on Israel. It was the Republican era with Henry Kissinger in the heyday of his diplomatic career, served as the Secretary of State under Nixon.

Out of the total 82 UN vetoes America exercised, 41 are on the Middle East question with Palestinian question at flashpoint.  They primarily revolved around the issues of situation in the occupied territories with Israeli atrocities committed against Palestinians; complaint of Lebanon or Syria against Lebanon; violation of UN Charter and international law; and expansion of Jewish settlement in Gaza and East Jerusalem. On July 26, 1973 U.S. vetoed a resolution which had nothing to do with terrorism but oriented international law question by affirming the rights of the Palestinians and established provisions for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories as embodied in the previous General Assembly resolutions.