The Pakistani Spectator

President Obama’s AF–PAK policy unveiled only last year is dead. There is a paradigm shift, in a total turnaround to Obama’s inaugural pledge to defeat Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. Today US and ISAF appear reconciled to the fact that, they cannot defeat them. The new design is to get the Afghan government to engage the Taliban and other militant groups into an intra Afghan dialogue process leading to reconciliation, power sharing and coexistence. The plan envisages a surge in military operations to soften the Taliban with a parallel effort at rapid development of infrastructure and establishment of government’s writ over Taliban controlled areas, create job opportunities and improving governance and under a crash programme, increase the size of Afghan Army and police forces, equip and train them into a credible force capable of relieving the US and ISAF Forces starting next year.

The end game is obvious and an exit strategy is being unfolded. The logic of timings to kick start the reconciliation process when the Taliban are at their strongest is strange. Trying to make a deal with them when they are in a position of strength is a poor option unless they have indicated their willingness to talk or if the Allies have bought out or made deals with some of the influential commanders who can cause massive defections from Taliban rank and file. Mullah Mutawakil, the ex- Taliban Foreign Minister and his likes who supposedly travelled to Dubai to meet the Afghan and UN representatives are ineffective by themselves but could possibly open doors to some of the Regional Commanders. Interestingly US and NATO while sponsoring intra Afghan dialogue are vehemently opposed to a similar reconciliation process between Pakistani Government and Taliban. They are pushing Pakistan to launch operation against the Taliban in North Waziristan. Double standards and dichotomy of thought process is visible. There are obvious blind spots in the modalities for the way forward. Apparently the dialogue process would be Afghan managed with US managing remotely.

It is questionable if Karzai enjoys the credibility to initiate the process? Secondly, whom the Afghans and others should be talking to? The US has a fixation on dialogue with the so-called good Taliban, Holbrooke excluded both Mullah Omar and Gulbadin Hikmatyar. It is yet to be seen how realistic is their wish to only deal with selected and screened good Taliban leaders who after joining the reconciliation process, may lose credibility and influence to pacify the majority of Taliban and marginalize Al-Qaeda. Then there is the question of credible intermediaries who could mediate between the Afghan Government and Taliban. Any intelligence animal would bear, how vital it is to maintain links with all elements in a low intensity conflict. Among the States which recognized the Taliban Government, UAE has limited influence and the Saudis seem reluctant, Karzai recently visited the Saudis to bring them on board. Pakistan despite credibility loss owing to its support for US and NATO forces, still remains the best placed intermediary. Gen Kayani had reportedly even offered to mediate during a briefing in Brussels last month. Failure is bitter, you only look for scapegoats in defeat. US and NATO found a scapegoat in Pakistani intelligence for their own failure to reign in the Taliban by persistently insinuating on Pakistani sympathy and links with the Taliban and other militant leaders like Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Haqqani and Maulvi Nazir, etc. Therefore, inviting Pakistanis to act as honest brokers does not appeal from US point of view and therefore could be a trap, any failure would be thrown at us.

To provide enabling environment for the reconciliation process, the US intends softening the Taliban by embarking on a surge to give the Taliban a series of strong drubbing in their strongholds starting with Helmand. The CIA would in parallel aggressively employ its drones to take out the militant leadership through surgical strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. With overwhelming firepower, the allies would be able to drive out the Taliban from their strongholds and the Taliban too would melt away by choice after causing substantial casualties on the foreign forces. However, due to limited numbers, the ability of occupation forces to hold the secured areas for a longer period is limited. The Taliban shall be able to slip back at opportune time. The answer is in the ability of Afghan National Army to relieve them, in its present state the ANA does not provide that solace. According to an analyst, the ANA is grossly non-representative; the numbers are tilted towards the ethnic groups which formed the Northern Alliance. Against a national population of 46% Pakhtuns, the ANA officer corps is more than 90% non Pakhtun and the rank and file are 80% non-Pakhtun.

US, however, is working on a crash programme for capacity enhancement of Afghan Army to make it capable of gradually relieving foreign troops. This week alone, one US cargo ship discharged more than a hundred Humvees at Karachi port for the Afghan National Army. Unfortunately, the rearming of the Northern Alliance based ANA will find little sympathy among the Pakistani security establishment. However, is the US doing anything to remove the ethnic imbalance in the ANA? If not ANA is unlikely to draw empathy in the Pakhtun belt. Western analysts and think tanks are suggesting to replicate the Iraq experience of reconciliation and a “divide and rule” strategy in Afghanistan. The two countries, the psyche of their people and circumstances are entirely different. Without going into any details and comparison, one can say that the idea is flawed. There has to be an Afghan based strategy to work in Afghanistan. The Taliban movement is an ideological movement which has shown extreme resilience.

Can Taliban be lured by the promise of jobs, security assurances, monetary offerings and development? What can the UN, US and hordes of other international agencies do in Pakhtun belt of Afghanistan in a short time span which they have failed to give over past nine years. What additional tools and plans have they developed to ensure rapid development of the Taliban dominated areas? Another grey area is the question of willing support for the reconciliation process among those who constitute the present elected Afghan Government. The warlords, drug barons and their likes who make the Afghan ruling alliance are unlikely to willingly share power with the Taliban. Karzai may be playing to the galleries in Washington and Brussels by initiating the reconciliation process but the underlying sentiment among his political colleagues may not be supportive. If the Taliban agree to join the democratic setup, do we see a mid-term elections?

Ever since the US has vaguely indicated the end game and its intent to exit, competitive forces have started jockeying for influence to fill in the vacuum. All states with contiguous borders with Afghanistan have an acute interest in its stability. However states like India who sees opportunity in Afghan chaos to create problems for its sworn enemies i.e. Pakistan and China wants Afghanistan to remain unstable. Unfortunately, Western powers including the US are encouraging India to assume a bigger role in the Afghan reconciliation process against Pakistan’s serious reservations. Pakistan has suffered the most due to Afghan instability, it has supported the war against Al-Qaeda and Taliban with everything at its disposal including our blood. However, there is little sympathy for Pakistan’s own national security concerns among the main international players. Even Gen McChrystal had stated last year that peace in Afghanistan cannot prevail unless the interests of the Pakistani state are taken into account and that increased Indian influence in Afghanistan and assigning any role for India in the Afghan affairs was counterproductive and unacceptable to Pakistan.

Pakistan would like a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, it doesn’t want the Taliban in power but the option of having a Pro Indian Northern Alliance oriented government is an unacceptable scenario for Pakistan. The US has not laid down the conditions that would be construed as success of their changed strategy and signal their departure, but it is unlikely that they would get the better of Taliban in the 18 months timeframe they are looking at. The US surge in Afghanistan would definitely have its impact on Pakistani border regions, the cross-border traffic of Taliban fighters would increase and it is expected that the drone attacks on Pakistani soil would also multiply. There is a possibility of a wave of refugees fleeing to Pakistan in the wake of fresh fighting. Moreover, the reequipping and strengthening of the Pro-Indian Northern Alliance based Afghan National Army would also have its impact on Pakistan. The coming months would be difficult ones for Pakistan, the recent statements attributed to US Vice President Joe Biden and US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates on Pakistan’s internal security dynamics are worrisome.

The Frontier Post