Historical Roots of Islamic Militancy in Pakistan and current scenario
By amicus • Feb 18th, 2010 • Category: Politics • 7 CommentsThis paper is a humble endeavor to look at ascendancy of Islamic Militancy in Pakistan, with a cursory glance at its historic perspective and its evolution in the sub-continent. The study proceeds on the following premise:
(i)The Islamic militancy has its origin in a strong tradition of defensive reaction to intrusion by alien culture in Muslim value-system or attempts by forces hostile to Islam at political domination.
(ii)It assumes itself to be based on the concept of retributive justice.
(iii)It has adopted methods that are not always consistent with or warranted by Islam.
After Islam established its political ascendancy in India with the foundation of the Sultanate of Delhi in 1206 AD, the principal threat it faced was philosophical and not military. This came in the form of Hindu India’s endeavor to assimilate Islam or to develop a synthesis with it, if not to out rightly devour it. Islam had spread in India largely due to the efforts of the Sufi saints, a large number of who came after the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258. The Sufi movement was prone to accepting influences from the revived Bhakti tradition that propounded identity of religions and emphasized monism in its teachings. However, the ulema (religious scholars) did not permit any flexibility in beliefs and shariah (Islamic law) and their uncompromising attitude, it seems, rescued Islam from getting polluted and corrupted by Hindu tenets. Occasionally some ulema called for adoption of high-handed methods against the Hindu community but the Sultans of Delhi viewed political considerations as far more important and, except when there was a military threat or armed revolt,never invoked the doctrine of jihad (holy struggle) by way of qital (holy war which is a form of jihad) to safeguard the political interests of Islam. The shariah remained supreme, irrespective of personal character of the sultan (ruler) and the religion of the majority was neither interfered with nor forced conversions were permitted.
Towards the end of the 16th century another challenge to Islam came in the form of religious policies of the Mughal Emperor, Jalaluddin Akbar (1556-1605), who endeavored to evolve a syncretic religious order in India. Akbar was initially an orthodox Muslim and had built an ibadat khana (house of worship) in Fatehpur Sikri, his new capital, to hold discourses on Islamic issues. The quarrels and rivalries between the ulema and the ugly scenes created by them during the debate prompted
Akbar to invite scholars and divines of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Zoroastrians, Judaism and Christianity to make himself familiar with their views on theological questions. This profoundly influenced Akbar’s outlook on religion. Already fed up
with the ulema’s capacity to interfere with his administration. Akbar went on to undermine their authority by acquiring for himself the right to choose between different interpretations of shariah as `sultan-i-adil’ (just ruler), if the ulema failed to develop a consensus on any point of law. Coercive measures of extreme nature, including executions, were employed to silence the dissenting ulema. Akbar also wanted to expand the political base of the Mughal Empire by securing wider support of his non-Muslim subjects. All these factors combined to make him proclaim a religious order that meant to dilute Islamic beliefs in uncompromising monotheism and prophet-hood of Hazrat Mohammad (P.B.H.U.) and to modify Islamic rites and social customs. His religious order did not make any considerable headway but the heterodoxy reigned supreme in the court.
In the war of succession, the orthodox ulema sided with Jehangir (1605-1627), the son of Akbar, on the condition that he would take steps to restore the power of orthodoxy in the court. Shaikh Ahmed of Sirhind (1564-1624), bestowed with the title of Mujahddid-i-Alf-i-Sani (the river of the religion in the first millennium), set in motion a process that culminated in the reign of Aurangzeb Alamgir (1658-1707),the most orthodox, pious and practicing Mughal Emperor. The sheikhs (divines) of the Mujaddidi order of Sufism, founded by Shaikh Ahmed of Sirhind, exercised tremendous influences on him. Not only Alamgir compiled Fatawa-u-Alamgiri, he re-imposed jizya (a tax on non-Muslims for protection under Muslim rule) that had been suspended by Akbar, destroyed some unauthorized temples and checked proselytizing activities of the Hindus. Since the Sikhs, the Marathas and the Jats posed a formidable threat to the Mughal authority, Alamgir had no option but to resort to military means to restore the writ of the central government.
After the death of Alamgir, the Mughal Empire, faced with internal disorder, headed for disintegration. In the east, the British East India Company expanded its domain and, in the west, the Sikhs and Marathas got firmly entrenched and often devastated Muslim life and property. Indian Muslims were bewildered, demoralized and displayed all signs of decay.
It was in this backdrop that Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) launched his movement for the reformation of Muslim society and the restoration of Islam’s political ascendancy in India. A thorough pan-Islamist at heart, he invited the Muslim ruler of Afghanistan, Ahmed Shah Abdali, to overcome the growing Maratha menace. In the meantime, the Nawab of Bangal, Sirajudduallah, was defeated by the British intrigues in the Battle of Plassey 1757 and the East India Company made itself the master of Bengal. The British success in the Battle of Buxer 1764 brought the British closer to Delhi.
Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824), the eldest son of Shah Waliullah, was a witness to the establishment of de facto British authority in Delhi in early 19th century. Shah Abdul Aziz issued a fatwa (religious decree) that; since the real power was vested in the British and the Mughal Emperor was no more effective in his own domain, India had become a darul harb (land of war). The fatwa implied that it was obligatory for the Muslims either to wage jihad to restore the supremacy of Islam in India or to migrate to some place where shariah was supreme. The Britishers were discreet enough not to interfere with the day-to-day religious observances of the Muslims unlike the Sikhs who ruled the Punjab and parts of the NW.F.P.
Shah Abdul Aziz impressed upon Syed Ahmed Shaheed (1786-01831) to organize jihad against the Sikhs. Syed Ahmed Shaheed received wide spread support in northern and eastern India for the mission assigned to him. Making the northwestern frontier region his base, he waged a jihad to liberate the Muslims of the Punjab from the Sikh yoke. The military engagements continued from 1826 to 1831 but the misgivings between his Pathan and non-Pathan disciples made him militarily weak. His haste in imposing the so-called `puritan’ version of Islam without taking into consideration the local customs and sectarian differences undermined his appeal in the region.
He fell a victim to the treachery of local tribesmen and was martyred by the Sikhs along with hundreds of his troops in Balakot in 1831. At about the same time, Haji Shariatullah (768-1840) and Titu Mir (1782-1832) declared that Bengal had become darul harb and raised the banner of jihad against Hindu landlords who persecuted the Muslim peasants and interfered with their religion.
The mujahideen were disheartened by the failure of these movements but the spirit of jihad was not completely extinguished. During, what is known as the sepoy mutiny of 1857, the remnants of the mujahidden of north India continued their mission to
inculcate the spirit of jihad spirit. The British imprisoned, hanged or sent into exile several of the ulema to overcome the threat.
The dichotomy in Muslim response to the establishment of the British rule was very conspicuous in the aftermath of the 1857 revolt. The traditionalist ulema, who derived inspiration from Shah Waliullah and Shah Abdul Aziz, decided to reconsider their tactics. They founded a dar-ul-uloom (house of learning) in Deoband, a small town in northern India, in 1867, under the leadership of Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanawtawi with a view to impart higher learning in Islamic theology and to work for
the revival of Islam’s political fortune in India.
Witness to the failure of the zealots, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan a reformist, adopted an entirely different line. He advocated to the Muslims complete and unconditional loyalty to the British, repudiation of pan-Islamism, non-involvement in politics, emphasis on learning of English language and physical sciences and fresh interpretation of the Holy Quran in the light of scientific observations. Sir Syed declared India as darul aman (land of peace) where Muslim life and property were secure and they enjoyed religious freedom. India being darul aman, neither jihad nor migration to darul Islam was obligatory. Encouraged by the British, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was able to enlist the support of the upper class Muslims and exercised considerable influence till his death in 1898.
In the meantime, Maulana Nanawtawi, the head of Darul uloom Deoband, died in 1880 and was succeeded by Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi. Maulana Gangohi issued a fatwa to the effect that in worldly matters cooperation with the Hindus was permissible provided it did not violate the fundamental principles of Islam. In Islamic history, a notable example of cooperation with non-Muslims is the Charter of Medina 622, which recognized the composite character of the State of Medina under the Prophet of Islam. The followers of Deoband were encouraged by this fatwa to join the Indian National Congress and thereby come into mainstream politics. The former associates of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and other conservative Muslims formed the All India Muslim League in 1906.
In 1905, a more dynamic person, Maulana Mahmood-ul-Hasan, succeeded Maulana Gangohi as the head of the Darul Uloom Deoband. Maulana Hasan was a pan-Islamist to the core and a staunch anti-imperialist. In the wake of the First World War, he actively involved himself in organizing revolutionary activities against the British government in India. The revolutionary methods were not something entirely new for the Indians. B.G. Tilak, a Hindu extremist leader, had employed such methods between 1905 and 1911 to compel the government to annul the partition of the province of Bengal. The political extremists were also familiar with the techniques used by the Russian revolutionaries. The Turks and the Germans also encouraged anti-British activities and assisted the government-in-exile of India set up in Kabul under the leadership of Raja Mahendra Pratap, Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi and Maulvi Barkatullah.
After the First World War ended, the terms offered to the Ottoman Khalifa (Caliph)under the Treaty of Sevres were extremely harsh. The orthodox Muslims considered the Khailafat (Caliphate) as an institution that was divinely ordained and a product of ijma (consensus) of the companions of the Prophet of Islam. The continuation of the Khailifat, therefore, was an article of faith with the Muslims and they were obliged to make a common cause with the Hindus who, under the leadership of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, were already agitating for political rights and liberties. In this backdrop, Jamiat-i-Ulemia-i-Hind (association of the religious scholars of India) was founded in 1919 with a membership that came predominantly from the ulema of Deoband. In due course it assumed the role of political wing of the Darul Uloom Deoband. The Khilafat Conference, a body exclusively formed to promote the cause of Khilafat, had a more diverse and varied membership. The Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements launched jointly by the Jamiat-I-Ulema-i-Hind, the Khilafat Conference and the Indian National Congress electrified the masses in a manner unprecedented in Indian history. Religious appeal led to mass mobilization and the British government found it next to impossible to contain the agitation. Some ulema revived the fatwa of India being darul harb and called upon the Muslims to migrate to Afghanistan.
After accepting a few thousand Indian Muslims Afghanistan declined to give shelter to more. Hundreds perished due to the hardship of travel and weather. Gandhi called off the Khalifat movement when it turned violent and twenty-two policemen were burnt alive by a mob. During the agitation the Moplahs (an Arab community of peasant) of Malabar Coast proclaimed their local khilafat and offered the Quran or sword to Hindu landlords and British officers. The government had to deploy troops to crush the Moplah revolt. The ultimate casualty of the involvement of religion in politics was communal harmony in India with some Muslim and Hindu extremists urging the youth of their respective communities to get marital training.
In the aftermath of the Khilafat movement the Muslims League emerged as the principal political organization of the Indian Muslims and in 1940 demanded the partition of the sub-continent. It identified Pakistan slogan with Islam to capture the imagination of common Muslims and to mesmerize them with romanticism of Islam’s past glory.
A small faction of Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind broke away from its parent organization to support the Pakistan demand whereas the main body opposed the partition on the ground that it would divide Indian Muslims without solving the communal question.
In the mid 1940s, Syed Abul Aala Mauddodi founded his Jamaa’ at-i-Islami. In many respect the Jama-at-i-Islami was inspired by the Ikhwan-ul-Muslamoon of the Middle East. It too opposed the partition of the subcontinent and expressed the view that
the leadership of the Muslim League lacked the essential qualities required to establish an Islamic State. After the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, the break away faction of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind, which adopted the name of Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, and Jamat-i-Islami became the harbinger of the movement to establish Islamic theocracy in the country. In 1957 the Jamat-i-Islami opted for electoral politics to implement its version of Islamic system through constitutional means. Jamiat-i-Islami’s appeal remained confined to a section of intelligentsia and student community and it performed very dismally in the national elections of 1970.
It was in the wake of military action in former East Pakistan that the Jama’at sponsored militant groups, Al-Badr and Al-Shams, fought along with the Pakistan Armed Forces against the Mukti bahini (liberation army) and Indian aggressors. The Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam also failed to make its mark on national level and its appeal remained largely confined to the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan in the elections of 1970.
The Jama’at-i-Islami was a nuisance for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto during his rule from late 1971 to mid 1977. Bhutto agreed to declare Islam as the state religion of Pakistan in the constitution of 1973 and Ahmedis as a minority under the pressure of religious parties. He also used several religion-related gimmicks to establish his Islamic credentials with the masses. However, after the charges of rigging in the elections of 1977. Bhutto could not withstand the onslaught in which the students belonging to Islami Jamiat-i-Talba, the student wing of Jama-at-i-Islami, and madrassah students belonging to Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam were in the forefront. The middle class bazaar people of the urban areas, under considerable influence of Jama’at-i-Islami, also played a crucial role in the downfall of Bhutto. The finest hour for the Jama’at came when marital law was imposed on 5 July 1977.
The War against Evil Empire and Islamic Fundamentalists:
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979 offered unique opportunity to the United States to weaken its principal adversary, and to General Zia to prolong his obscurantism rule. A resistance movement imbedded with Islamic
fervor appeared to be the most effective counter-measure to bleed the Soviets.
The Pakistan ISI and the American CIA masterminded the formation, logistics and action plan of the mujahideen outfits. They secured services of the Jama-at-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam for inculcating the spirit of jihad and recruiting rank and file to fight what was primarily an American war. Foreign elements, including Egyptians, Palestinians and Saudis, were inducted in the mujahideen groups.
The mujahideen movement thus became a meeting point for Islamic militants of Afghanistan. Pakistan and the Middle East. The United States, without any scruples, promoted and used Islamic militancy to defeat the Evil Empire. Generally the people from Pakistan and abroad professed and practiced the Puritan Schools of Islamic Shariah, where the Jehad is a practiced article of faith.
Unfortunately, after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States consigned that country to oblivion and the Mujahedeen or Islamic Fundamentalist militants became a liability for Pakistan. With its almost entire
western borders destabilized as Afghanistan was in turmoil and heavy burden of rogues, Pakistan had no option but to groom the Taliban (students) in its madrasahs to create a force that could restore law and order in Afghanistan.
Islam is a religion of peace but it is being projected as the principal source of international terrorism. The West must distinguish between militancy in the cause of national liberation and the use of force by states to extinguish the spark of freedom. With Muslims being persecuted, maimed and killed from Palestine to Kashmir to Philippines there can be no peace.
United States War against Terrorism:
In the after math of the most inhuman and barbaric acts of terrorism carried out in United States of America by the International Islamic Terrorist out fit, it seems, that country and the civilized world at large, were jolted and came to realize that the menace had grown out of proportion and was bent upon destroying the established order.
The US led coalition, after some preparations and requisite deployments, commenced the War against Terror. Pakistan, as neighbor of Afghanistan and a supporter of the Regime in Afghanistan was in a quandary. It was not left with any options but to support the US led effort against taking out that rogue regime in Afghanistan.
It may not be out of place to mention that, even before the September 11 impasse, the threat perception within the Defense Establishment of Pakistan was going through a rethinking and re-evaluation owing the activities going on inside Afghanistan under the tutelage of Taleban Regime and the Al-Qaeda Movement and its activities inside Pakistan like elsewhere in the world.
The act of the Taleban Regime of destroying the Historic Statues of Lord Buddha, despite best of efforts by Pakistan at persuading them to refrain from such uncivilized act, had not only frustrated Pakistan but also made Pakistan realize that its support for them was in fact emboldening that regime to an extent where the National Interest of Pakistan was being compromised at the altar of their so called Pan Islamic agenda. It was becoming all the more clear that Talebans and Al-Qaeda had expansionist designs and in that regard Pakistan was not an exception.
In the after math of the most inhuman and barbaric acts of terrorism carried out in United States of America by the International Islamic Terrorist out fit, it seems, that country and the civilized world at large, were jolted and came to realize that the menace had grown out of proportion and was bent upon destroying the established order.
The US led coalition, after some preparations and requisite deployments, commenced the War against Terror. Pakistan, as neighbor of Afghanistan and a supporter of the Rogue Regime in Afghanistan was in a quandary.
It was not left with any options but to support the US led effort against taking out that rogue regime in Afghanistan, albeit, owing not only being part of the Civilized Society but its own threat perceptions, emanating via the covert and overt activities of Taleban and Al-Qaeda nexus inside Afghanistan, globally and more so within Pakistan.
If anything the event of September 11 only hastened the decision making process in the Pakistani Defense Establishment in as much as the defiant and rigid posture of the Taleban Regime on the issue of handing over UBL and his coterie to the Americans, despite persuasions by Pakistan, acted as a catalyst for Pakistan to arrive at a pragmatic decision. The rigidity, defiance and self-serving stance of the Taleban Regime had placed Pakistan at a crossroad. It had to choose between its own National Interest and its place in the comity of civilized world and Isolation, being branded as a state that was allegedly promoting militancy and terrorism.
The conduct of the Talebans and Al-Qaeda has, if anything caused tremendous damage to the cause of the people of Kashmir. The ground realities dictated that the said elements were, with their expansionist designs, thoroughly indulging in talibanisation of Civil Society in Pakistan. Besides, promoting factionalism and sectarian violence. It was, to say the least, putting the unity of Pakistan at peril.
Having said that, it would be wrong to assume that Pakistan just caved in under the pressure from Washington. The truth would be that the pace of Pakistan distancing itself from what was going on in side Afghanistan was hastened rather accelerated.
It could also be said that may be, owing conducive international environment, was fortified in taking that vital decision.
This of necessity should translate into moral and material support for Pakistan to wit stand the fall out of annihilation of that regime from Afghanistan and so also imminent reaction from with in Pakistan from the segment that is sympathetic or
allied with the fundamentalist forces.
The short-term objectives set out by the International coalition were attained in matter of months and the Rogue Regime along with its partner Al-Qaeda was dislodged from Afghanistan. An interim set was brought in its place, headed by Karazai.
After being dislodged, the Taleban and Al-Qaeda Forces simply melted away and blended into the local population of Afghanistan and in side Pakistan. The pro-Islamic forces within these two countries, being quite sympathetic appears to
have willingly absorbed these forces on the run.
Question is does dislodging the Taleban government from Afghanistan and dismantling the Al-Qaeda network in that country resolves the issue? No.
The ground realities show that the safe sanctuaries for these elements on the run are very much intact, alive and kicking. There is no dearth of sympathetic element within Afghanistan and Pakistan in the so-called respective establishments.
Before 9/11 it was the policy of the Government of Pakistan to support the since deceased Taleban Regime. The Afghan territory was being used as training grounds for members of Al-Qaeda and odd 30 other such out fits from same number of countries to promote militancy in those countries and also to carryout acts of terrorism against the US interests around the world. It is true that those training grounds inside Afghanistan have for now, been uprooted and closed.
It means that immediate and constant threat emanating from Afghanistan may have been addressed. It would be nearer home instead, to say that for now it may be comparably diluted. The capabilities of International Terror may have been in
disarray and perceptibly its connectivity may also have been disrupted. It could not be said with any certainty that it has been qualitatively contained to an extent that it has been incapacitated.
The factual position is that there has been significant damage caused to the International Terror Groups. There safe heaven has been neutralized. An environment has been created that has made the lift difficult for the militants and its leadership in side Afghanistan, Pakistan and their respective countries and elsewhere.
However, it is equally true that all these significant achievements could at best be termed as containment. It is equally true that 9/11 has rudely awakened the world to the threat of this millennium. The state of alert is there. The commitment is also there. It is also equally true that militarily the preparation is also there to meet any potential threat.
The respite, if it could be termed as such, ought have been simultaneously put to use to address the causes, which have taken the things to such an impasse that that brand of militancy and terrorism has become the greatest threat to civilized world.
With due deference one dares to say that in the long run the gains so far made would be wasted and the world may wind up with the same problem with more complexities and capabilities.
LONG TERM REQUIREMENTS:
Having said that it would be in the fitness of things to peep in to the History of the Puritan Islamic Movements in the South Asia, Middle East and Far East and so also in the Balkans.
It is also of paramount importance that Islam is viewed as a World Religion side by side with Christianity and Judaism, Revelation being a common source of these religions.
There should be a concerted effort to accept, high light and promote the pacific basis of Islam. The Sufi doctrine of Islam has volumes to offer to Muslims and World at large.
The Islamic Fundamentalist Clergy has to be engaged via the proponents of peaceful, moderate and tolerant Islamic Clergy, which abound through out the world.
A meaningful and qualitative dialogue over World Media may be in immediate order. The dialogue being conducted in the Vatican since the early sixties should on the one hand be accelerated and on the other projected globally. Let there be meeting
of the minds globally.
Merely by saying that it is not a clash of Civilizations or that it is not a war against Islam would not do. The situation on ground dictates otherwise. The isolating Muslims and relying on the support of the governments in Islamic Countries would not suffice in the long term.
Besides, it also needs to be analysed that time and again the West has tolerated and in some cases abetted or even promoted militancy in the name of Islam. Wisdom of such acts at a given moment in the recent History should be called in question. It should provide a lesson for future course of action. In the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan it is the truth. The menace or monster left by the West in the after math of Soviet defeat has to be annihilated or neutralized. It has to be addressed
not only through military means but more so by strengthening the moderate and peace loving citizens of these countries.
Bringing in qualitative and quantitative socio economic in puts in the areas of education, health, economic opportunities and moderate and good governments. It is a daunting task. But there are no short cuts.
THE GROUND SITUATION:
One may say with some degree of confidence that the threat is only skin deep. It is very much there. It is regrouping and reorganizing. It will surface with new tactics and strategies. The only way out is that they should not find sympathy in a given society or in a given segment of a society like ours.
This could only happen if a realistic approach is adopted and with consistent efforts and involvement of opinion makers in such societies it is hammered in the minds of the people that the so called Islamite are nothing but misguided religious
zealots hiding behind the religious makeup.
Spreading the Islamic Message of Peace, Tolerance and coexistence on Gods earth could only do this. Islamic History is replete with examples of peaceful coexistence and Freedom of Faith. Even a small allocation of funds in the area of
high lighting the message of Islam that Islam literally means Peace could do wonders, albeit side by side with the consistent and persevered efforts at making life impossible for the so-called Islamite.
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This is a very elaborative research done on a very sensitive topic. In my opinion, Islam was never left alone as a religion by the past rulers or politicians. They used it to market themselves and politicized Islam as well for their own vested interests. Religion should be kept from politics because political sphere’s involves a lot of other players which may not belong to the same faith and in the long run it just creates that uncomfortable rift between the involved parties.
Quote: Spreading the Islamic Message of Peace, Tolerance and coexistence on Gods earth could only do this. Islamic History is replete with examples of peaceful coexistence and Freedom of Faith. Even a small allocation of funds in the area of high lighting the message of Islam that Islam literally means Peace could do wonders.
No religion preaches hate; it is the extremists who distort the ideology for their political ambitions. I agree that the coexistence has long been an Islamic tradition and we need to highlight such positive traits. An allocation in this regard is needed but more importantly it must be ensured that the funds are used of the said purposes. Under the Kerry Lugger bill Pakistan will be provided 1.5 billion USD every year in terms of civilian aid for reforms in energy, health and agriculture.
amicus, you need to read the Munir Report on 1953 Punjab riots which caused the first marshal law in the country;
http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/MunirReport.pdf (Urdu)
http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/report_1953.pdf (English)
amicus, you need to read the Munir Report on 1953 Punjab riots which caused the first marshal law in the country;
thepersecution.org/dl/MunirReport.pdf (Urdu)
thepersecution.org/dl/report_1953.pdf (English)
“the religion of the majority was neither interfered with nor forced conversions were permitted.”
Mostly a total lie.
Except during the time of Akbar and Shah Jahan…..almost everyother Islamic ruler tried “forced conversions”
The tyranny reached its peak during Aurangzeb’s time. No wonder Mughal rule ended soon after.
“In the war of succession, the orthodox ulema sided with Jehangir (1605-1627), the son of Akbar, on the condition that he would take steps to restore the power of orthodoxy in the court. Shaikh Ahmed of Sirhind (1564-1624), bestowed with the title of Mujahddid-i-Alf-i-Sani (the river of the religion in the first millennium), set in motion a process that culminated in the reign of Aurangzeb Alamgir (1658-1707),the most orthodox, pious and practicing Mughal Emperor. The sheikhs (divines) of the Mujaddidi order of Sufism, founded by Shaikh Ahmed of Sirhind, exercised tremendous influences on him. Not only Alamgir compiled Fatawa-u-Alamgiri, he re-imposed jizya (a tax on non-Muslims for protection under Muslim rule) that had been suspended by Akbar, destroyed some unauthorized temples and checked proselytizing activities of the Hindus. Since the Sikhs, the Marathas and the Jats posed a formidable threat to the Mughal authority, Alamgir had no option but to resort to military means to restore the writ of the central government.”
The above portion of the article CLEARLY SHOWS author’s islamist extremist mindset.
Look what this moron has written:
“”destroyed some unauthorized temples and checked proselytizing activities of the Hindus.”"
In order to hide the TREMENDOUS DESTRUCTION of temples during the period of “extremist-in-chef” Aurangzeb…..how conveniently this guy called those temples “unauthorized”……haha
Then comes a huge lie……..” proselytizing activities of the Hindus.” NON-SENSE.
Hindus dont have any conversion mechanism UNLIKE muslims.
Then how come hindus “proselytizing”???????
Author further writes:
” Aurangzeb Alamgir (1658-1707),the most orthodox, pious and practicing Mughal Emperor.”
Even Osama Bin-Laden , Mullah Omar are very “pious and practicing” muslim leaders!!!!!!!
The scholar, the sufi, and the fanatic
By Nadeem F. Paracha
Roughly speaking, the political and social aspects of Islam in Pakistan can be seen as existing in and emerging from three distinct sets and clusters of thought. These clusters represent the three variations of political and social Islam that have evolved in this country: modern, popular and conservative.
The modern aspect of Islamic thought in Pakistan has its roots in the ‘Aligarh Movement’ – a nineteenth century effort launched by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.
His analysis convinced him that the Muslims of India had failed to come to grips with the new zeitgeist emerging from the rise of western colonialism – a power driven by breakthroughs in modern scientific thought and economics, and pragmatic politics based on rational and dispassionate self-interest, all of which stemmed from the many doctrines and socio-political upheavals witnessed in the West during the ‘Age of Reason/Enlightenment.’
Ahmed strived to reinterpret the teachings of Islam so they could be brought in harmony with modern science and philosophy, helping the educated Muslims to continue holding on to their religion but through a rational and enlightened view of life.
Though accused of heresy by conservative Islamic scholars, Ahmed managed to lay the foundations of a modern college in Aligarh in an attempt to draw young Muslims away from the traditional madrassahs towards a place of learning where religious studies would be supplemented by the teaching of modern ‘secular subjects.’
The Aligarh College, that later became a university, soon spawned what came to be known as the ‘Aligarh generation’ – groups of young educated Muslims who would go on to lay the initial foundations of the Pakistan Movement and also become the intellectual engines behind the movement’s central ideological thrust.
Though the Aligarh generation was trained in western law, politics and science, it also held dear Ahmad’s notion that the Muslims of India were a separate cultural community; a thought that was molded into the Two Nation Theory by the All India Muslim League. Much has been contemplated about Jinnah’s ideological orientation, but it is rather clear that the new country was founded on an understanding of Islam that was steeped in Ahmed’s modern Islamic tradition.
The Aligarh tradition that was carried into the corridors of the state and governance of Pakistan pointed towards the new country as being a modern Muslim majority republic, as opposed to a theocratic Islamic State. In fact, the Pakistani state and governments between 1947 and 1977 used (in varying degrees) the above rationale to keep at bay the religious parties’ demand for a theocratic state. But it is also true that the modern Aligarh Muslim mindset was largely an urban phenomenon, associated with the urban middle-class elite of the Punjab and Karachi.
The majority of Muslims in what became Pakistan remained ensconced in the region’s popular variations of Islam. The so-called Barelvi Islam that became the mainstay belief of a majority of Muslims in the subcontinent (from the nineteenth century onwards), was, as a movement, the reassuring enshrinement of the traditional hybrid-Sufism that prevailed among the Muslims due to the long periods of interaction between Sufi Islam and Hinduism.
This hybrid-Sufism, or Barlevi Islam, became the folk religion of the rural peasants, the urban proletariat and the semi-urban petty-bourgeoisie of the country. It incorporated the anti-clergy elements of Sufism, the jurisprudence doctrines of the more flexible Sunni Hanafi fiqh and, as had been the traditional practice of popular folk Islam of the region, fused these with the concept of overt religious reverence of divine concepts and people, and the accommodating forms of worship found in various shades of Hinduism.
The result was an Indian/Pakistani Muslim polity repulsed by the dogma of puritanical strains of the religion, open to the idea of modern reinterpretation of Islamic law, permissive in its sociology, and largely non-political in essence. At the same time, Barlevi Islam is criticised for being willingly embroiled in superstition and doctrinal ‘innovations.’
Though being populist and agrarian in its world view, Barlevi Islam did not negatively react to Ahmed’s modern Islamic reform. What’s more, it was the constant failure of the political exponents of puritanical Islamic thought to penetrate the thick veneer of Barlevi Islam surrounding the rural and urban masses of Pakistan that in turn facilitated the moderate Aligarh Muslim thought and tradition within the Pakistani state to continue deflecting theocratic maneuvers in the country’s overall political polity.
As various forms of Ahmed’s modern and rational Islamic notions continued to dictate the Pakistani state’s (albeit anti-pluralistic) politics, the masses-oriented make-up of Barlevi Islam became the chosen venue of populist politics in Pakistan.
The left-leaning Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) became the first Pakistani political party to set the tone of its manifesto and rhetoric according to the populist imagery of Barlevi Islam, in the process managing to attract the urban working classes and the rural peasantry towards its socialist program. Consequently, not only did the PPP chairman, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, became one of the first major Pakistani political figures to start being seen indulging in rituals associated with Barlevi Islam (such as visiting Sufi shrines), PPP rallies themselves started radiating an aura of the colourful and musical activity found outside many Sufi shrines of the region (such as the dhamal).
The 1970s in Pakistan thus became an era of populist extroversion. With Barlevi Islam adopted as a populist political expression by the ruling PPP. This saw a further hybridisation of Barlevi Islam. This form of expression eventually became the cultural and religious connect between the country’s secular political parties, the working classes and the peasants.
However, as the popular variation of Islam in Pakistan peaked in the 1970s, the modern variation (tied to the Aligarh thought) started to erode. Though the popular variation remained very much the focus of the populist Z A. Bhutto regime, things started to change at state level when after the 1971 East Pakistan debacle, a move was seen afoot in the army towards conservative (and elitist) variations of Islam, especially those advocated by renowned Islamic scholar and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) chief, Abul Ala Maududi.
The JI was an early advocate of what became to be known as Political Islam – a modern political theory that forwards the ‘historical’ and theological arguments for an evolutionary instatement of an Islamic state (or a modern-day caliphate) run on the dictates of the Shariah as an alternative to the capitalist-democratic system and socialism/communism.
Political Islam first emerged as an opponent of secular/socialist Muslim nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. After Egypt, Syria and Jordan’s defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967, secular Muslim nationalism started to give way to Political Islam.
Since the theological aspects of Political Islam were opposed to the more populist strains of the faith (such as Barlevi Islam), the JI in Pakistan was eventually successful in converting the urban middle-classes to its cause after these classes stopped resonating with the modern reformist variations of Islam in Pakistan. Thus, the urban bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie became the main players against the populist Bhutto regime during the 1976 PNA movement (led by the JI).
But it wasn’t until the arrival of the Ziaul Haq dictatorship and the anti-Soviet ‘Afghan Jihad’ that Political Islam managed to find state approval. Furthermore, as both the US and Saudi Arabia pumped in billions of dollars of aid so that Zia could construct an effective jihad against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, the more aggressive and puritanical strains of Islam (such as the Deobandi and Wahahbi) too began finding official sanction.
Conscious of the hold Barlevi Islam had in Pakistan, the Zia regime also attempted to penetrate and regulate Sindh and Punjab’s shrine culture, trying to align Barlevi thought with the clergy and jihad-heavy strains of conservative Islam that he was advocating.
The results were devastating. The corruption emerging from the large amounts of financial aid and state patronage Political Islam was able to enjoy in Pakistan during the Afghan jihad, steadily clipped away the intellectual aspects of the theory, and by 1989 (at the end of the Afghan war), Political Islam had become an empty shell in the hands of various Pakistani intelligence agencies who then filled this shell up with what would eventually surface as sheer fanaticism in the shape of sectarian organisations and phenomenon like the Taliban.
This fanaticism is now not only the militant mainstay of anti-intellectual and fanatic Islamist organisations, but, as a rude social discourse, it is being attracting a large number of the urban middle-classes as well who now seem completely detached from their early moorings towards the modern variations of Islam, and as well as from the faith’s more populist base.
Political Islam suffered from its overindulgence in an unpopular and puritanical theological feast that came attached with the patronage it got from conservative Muslim monarchies and dictatorships. By the early 1990s, it was as good as dead due to the many failures it faced to transform Muslim countries into living Islamic states.
However, it regenerated itself as a far more brutal, literalist and anti-intellectual fascist battle cry (in the shape of ‘Islamism’), which has not only been able to find support among the most desperate sections of the Pakistani society, but, unfortunately, also in the seemingly intellectually bankrupt edifice of urban middle-class Pakistan.