The Pakistani Spectator

As I mentioned in my last article, on February 27, 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Bob Schieffer, anchor of CBS News’ “Face the Nation,” moderated a seminar where Nicholas Burns, then Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, commented about drug production in Afghanistan:

“It is a country that has seen its largest poppy production over the last two years, largest in recorded history with a major narcotics problem. And we really haven’t arrived at a situation with the government where we have been able to figure out a strategy that has been successful either to inhibit people from growing poppy or to selling it on the world market. And it is a major problem for our European allies where the majority of the heroin in Europe comes from Afghanistan.”

In the seminar, after the speakers gave details about the production of drugs in Afghanistan, I invited Colonel David W. Lamm, U.S. Army (Ret.) and former Chief of Staff, Combined Forces in Afghanistan, for further elaboration by asking:

“And my question to the chief of staff [Col. Namm] is about drugs and like, the production of opium is on the highest level. I used to work on the Hill seven or eight years ago, and I remember we wanted to declare Pakistan as a terrorist state because of some Pakistani generals who were making good money in the drug trade [in Afghanistan]. But who should be blamed now for the highest production of opium in Afghanistan, [given] the Pakistani Generals are not involved in Afghanistan anymore?”

Let’s share Secretary Burns’ views — to my question of production of drugs – on the ease of Alqaeeda and Taliban members to escape to FATA and Wazirstan after they do their deeds in Afghanistan — before learning Colonel Namm’s response.

“But it’s been the lack of effectiveness of that military effort, especially in recent months, which has been very troubling. What does that do? It gives these two groups the capacity to hide, to seek refuge, to replenish themselves, to seek money and support, particularly off the drug trade inside of Pakistan; to strike across the border — it’s a very difficult terrain to fight in —  at our forces, Afghan forces and the NATO forces,” the secretary responded.

Here he meant to appreciate the efforts of Pakistani forces who are fighting in a very difficult terrain without having sufficient training against a counterinsurgency or civilian rebellion like the Pakistani Taliban.

However, the Pakistani government may want to take note of what the Secretary said about the ‘Taliban seeking money and support off the drugs trade inside of Pakistan.’
Having listened to Secretary Burns’ articulate, detailed, and honest response, the Anchor Schieffer asked Colonel Lamm if he wanted to add to my question of Afghan-Pakistani border and the American allegations of a few Pakistani generals becoming millionaires by facilitating drug trade in Afghanistan before and during the Taliban regime.

Instead of responding if its warlord and some Afghan or whatever Generals who are making a kill in drugs trades, Col. Lamm said:

“No matter which, or how, the political situation turns out in Islamabad, from my perspective the current government in Islamabad and any future government, I would suspect, is going to be very sincere about controlling its borders with Afghanistan. The problem is one of practicality and control, to say yes, we will do what we can in the FATA along the Afghan border. Given the terrain and the issues, given the folks who occupy those border positions in the Army and other services, it’s a very dubious task to say yes, we are going to control the border and keep folks from crossing back and forth. It has always been a very difficult problem.”

In the responses to my same questions these two speakers gave somewhat different answers.  Compared to Secretary Burns’s, Col. Lamm’s response reflects that the Pentagon people tend to demonstrate some deeper sympathy and understanding for Pakistan because — contrary to the Department of States — they have to deal with the practical problems the Pakistani army is confronted with.

Let’s see how some other civilians perceive the Afghani-Pakistani issue in Washington.

On July 10, 2007, for example, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace arranged a seminar titled “Rethinking Western Strategies Toward Pakistan.”  A French-American scholar on South Asia named Frederic Grare criticized Pakistan for the Taliban’s  infiltration into Afghanistan.

I stated to Grare that we in the States have every kind of the latest technology and huge economic resources, but still we are unable to control illegal immigrants wanting to cross into America from Mexico. Then I asked scholar Grare why he assumed that a poor country like Pakistan could effectively control a border with Afganistan over a thousand miles long.

In that seminar, the Pakistani Defense Attache Khawar Hanif made a strong and articulate statement saying that the people suggesting the reduction of U.S aid to Pakistan should analyze U.S. involvement in Iraq. Despite spending billion of dollars, as a superpower, the U.S. is unable to control the situation in Iraq, a country smaller than Pakistan. However despite Pakistan’s very limited economic resources and its support for a million of Afghan refugees, Pakistan is doing a very effective job in South Asia, he stated. The people intending to disturb the delicate balance in South Asia should ask themselves if they really envision another potential Iraq in South Asia, the DA warned.

At the CSIS, Col. Lamm elaborated more on my statement of drug trade in Afghanistan by saying:  “on the narcotics side – and he will just go back to President Kharzai —  right after his inauguration he convened a narcotics jirga in December of 2004. And that year, with the concerted effort with USAID, the United States and at that time, under the Bonn agreement, the U.K. was the lead nation for narcotics. We had a broad campaign in the Helmand Valley and that year, narcotics production went from about 130,000 hectares to 104,000 hectares. That sort of unity effort came apart later in 2005 and then, of course, in 2006 it was up to 160,000 hectares and we’re going to be near 200,000 now.”

Col. Lamm did not mention President Karzai’s recent weakening efforts resulting in the expansion of drug production in Afghanistan.

He concluded his remarks by suggesting a comprehensive strategy:

“That problem rests squarely with the people of Afghanistan. And discussions about, you know, aerial spraying, discussions about other countries making deals to take care of the property problem; that’s not going to help. That has to come from the Afghans themselves with a great deal of international assistance, a comprehensive plan that not only talks about eradicating poppy on the one hand, but has to be teamed up very, very carefully and adroitly with alternate livelihood programs and jobs programs to bring it down, which is how we did it in 2004.”

Though Col. Lamm did not blame any Afghan Generals, it was satisfying to hear that the Pakistani Generals are not involved in making any money anymore in any drug trade in Afghanistan.

Not only were his views very similar to those of journalist Ahmed Rashid, who according to Washington Post Parade magazine of June 1, 2008, said: “Farmers are growing poppies to survive. You can’t destroy the drug trade unless you give an alternative by investing in agriculture: roads, schools, irrigation.”

It’s interesting to note that after the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, Pakistan lost its significance in U.S. foreign policy.

The days I used to work on the Hill, the Indian lobby had become very active against Pakistani interests because it believed that Pakistan was fooling around in the Indian part of Kashmir.

Since, contrary to India, Pakistan is a Muslim state, Washington loves to find fault in it.  Bill Clinton’s administration was not very different than any other typical American administration.  General Musharraf took over in Ocober 1999 without American blessing.  Because of the Kargill crisis, created by Musharraf, the Indian government knew Musharraf as a troublemaker. As an Urdu speaker, he wanted to prove to his Punjabi colleague generals that he is not less bold and adventurous than them.  Since we Indian Pakistanis came from the same stomach, we understand each others nature better than Americans can.

The Indian administration felt very insecure that Musharaff – as a head of Pakistan — was going to create more trouble in Indian occupied Kashmir. Consequently, the Indian lobby became very active on the Hill. There were a few pro-India Member of Congress who would then entertain the idea of declaring Pakistan as a terrorist state.

Moreover, in international politics, it is easier to blame and find a scapegoat in a poor and weak country.  As a poor, Muslim state, Washington – during Bill Clinton’s presidency —  would find fault in Pakistan, especially because of Musharraf.

In blaming Pakistani generals in profiting from the drug trade, one does not take into account the dire economic situation in Pakistan —  especially in the FATA and NWFP, and the social context in which the people in that part of the world live — that necessitates taking any opportunity available to try to make money to make a living.

The true crime in Pakistan is the crime of widespread, vast poverty.  This crime, however, is not one that America pays much attention to and is far less interesting for the American media to cover.  Probably Secretary Burns and Col. Lamm didn’t understand my question of the direction of drug trade money in Afghanistan.  But I would not say that they conveniently ignored my question about it.