The Pakistani Spectator

As the US continues to deepen its intrusiveness in the affairs of Pakistan, there is a growing sense of disquiet as one senses increasingly strange developments within Pakistan’s policy-making circles. It is not just the absurdity of witnessing the public signing of minutes of negotiations and seeing the total abandonment of all protocol; nor is it the whole bizarre drama enacted by the Foreign Minister in the aftermath of the disastrous talks with India and the Interior Minister’s efforts to appease hurt Indian egos; nor is it the strong advocacy of General Kayani by Ms Clinton. All these have become part of a black comedy since we embraced the lethal US so-called war on terror. There have been some fleeting glimmers of hope that we could extricate ourselves from this deadly US embrace, as when the military seemed to put its foot down on the unacceptable conditionalities of the Kerry-Lugar Bill that has since become US law. One thought at least on the strategic front, there would be resistance to US diktat, but as events have shown this is not the case at all. Why was there that hope in the first place, given how the political and military leadership have been part of the drone strategy - declaratory statements to the contrary notwithstanding - and of indiscriminate use of air and ground fire in the FATA operations? Probably because one clings on to any straw available as one sees the green and white reflecting our sovereignty and nationhood being enveloped in the stars and stripes of a neo-imperialist USA.

But it is now only too clear that all the policy-makers have chosen to make us a loyal satellite to the US. Much has already been said in these columns on the PAF and the conditionalities attached by the US to its purchase of F-16s. So nervous is the PAF about its questionable US links that it is not prepared to come clean on how many bases it continues to give to the American military! But all these could be seen as tactical compromises, if they are not part of a broader, long-term military policy. That is where one had hoped things would be different and there would be a realisation, based on historical experience and prevailing ground realities, that an alliance with the US has always had more costs than benefits, if we see it within a national perspective and not simply from a rulers’ prism.
Unfortunately, it would appear that the military has also chosen to go along with US diktat once the American decision makers began to bypass the civilian leadership and deal with the military directly on strategic issues. Hence, although the Kerry-Lugar Act did not make any alterations in its content as a result of the Pakistan military’s very valid protests, we do not hear anything more on that front; so clearly the aid conditionalities have been accepted. One major outstanding issue is the nuclear issue and Dr Khan, but that would be difficult for any leadership to compromise upon without facing the public wrath of the nation. Not everything can be compromised covertly and successfully!

So what has led one to the conclusion that there has been a larger policy level compromise between the Pakistani strategic decision makers and the US? The fact that a policy on how to secure Pakistan’s strategic interests, which was approved by the JCS HQ earlier this year, had as its central point and its main conclusion that “Pakistan’s strategic interests will be secured within the framework of a cooperative relationship with the United States.” This is our tragedy today. So while outdated discussions continue to be sponsored on Indian strategies like Cold Start - on which a multitude of official and unofficial analyses and conclusions already exist since the concept is not new anymore - the fact is that we have chosen to remain within the confines of US demands and policy goals. And what we should be focusing on, therefore, is what this means for the country. What sort of strategic interests can we secure if we remain within the present contours of a “cooperative” relationship with the US - which effectively is more of a one way demand-seeking relationship?

Let us examine our strategic interests that we are seeking to secure and see how the present relationship with the US can actually secure them - if at all!
First: A secure and stable domestic environment. Clearly, with our military operations in FATA and our complicity in the US drone policy, the threat of terrorism has increased manifold in Pakistan post-9/11. Not only that, we have seen a qualitative change in the form of this terrorism striking Pakistanis across the country with suicide bombers proliferating almost en masse. Here, the US plays a critical role in creating space for future militants, and its encouragement of Indian activities in Afghanistan allows external support for some of these militant groups - especially those operating in sensitive areas like Balochistan. The alliance with the US has so far been a highly destabilising factor domestically for Pakistan as the negative perception of the US has increased over time. If the Government of Pakistan was able to delink itself from the US, the operational environment for it domestically would alter qualitatively into a favourable one and stability would become more feasible. So this core interest cannot be secured if we remain tied to the US.

Second: Securing a stable economy also cannot be achieved as long as we are the frontline state for the US in its “war on terror”, regardless of the aid inflows. The non-monetary costs of the war are far too great and so is the damage to trade and foreign investment. One advantage we could have gained from our close relationship with the US would have been access to US and EU markets, especially for our textiles, but that they are not prepared to grant. Meanwhile, the IMF and World Bank have been given amazing access into the country and their wayward and destructive policies, run by their chosen economic managers are playing havoc with the lives of ordinary Pakistanis who are being hit with spiralling prices of necessities. So again the goal of a stable economy cannot be achieved as long as we remain in US clutches.

Third: Sustaining the credibility of our nuclear deterrence. Here again, the US continues to pressure Pakistan on all aspects of its nuclear development, including the civilian energy programme. As long as we remain a Muslim state, the US will continue to oppose our nuclear programme, no matter how “close” we bind ourselves to them. So much has already been revealed about US designs on our nuclear programme that no more needs to be stated.

Fourth: Securing ourselves from the continuing threat from India. In fact, the US has undermined our balance vis-à-vis India by pressuring us into conceding to Indian demands, including on the land route for its trade. In contrast, the US is not prepared to exert any pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Even the military balance has been disturbed because of the US giving India all manner of strategic weapons, including transfer of sensitive technology and the missile defence system. And there are no conditionalities on how and against whom these weapons can be used. The Indo-US nuclear deal itself will allow India to increase its nuclear weapons build up because of the liberated unsafeguarded fissile material from civilian reactors.

Fifth: Securing our Eastern front where our main threat still emanates from. The US has, in fact, made our eastern border with India insecure by forcing our military to move westwards and into FATA, while Indian deployments along this border remain unchanged and its forward bases continue to increase. It is in such circumstances that India can afford to be adventurous with Cold Start doctrines and pre-emptive limited war strategies. So the alliance with the US is undermining our security rather than enhancing it.

Sixth: Even our traditionally stable relationship with our friendly neighbour Iran has been jeopardised by us giving the US access in Balochistan through which to destabilise the Iranian regime, with whom we have no dispute. This has created a new factor of strategic instability for us.
Finally, if we have some regard for the lives of our citizens, then the lives lost, both civilian and military, in pursuit of the US war agenda have become far too many for us to continue to sustain - especially since the US continues its mantra of “do more”. If the alliance with the US is killing our people rather than securing their lives, then how can our military secure any strategic interests by remaining within a “cooperative” relationship with the US? Or are there some other “strategic interests” that are now primary?