The Pakistani Spectator

One was still recovering from the absurdity of referring to the much-touted Obama policy on Pakistan as “new” when his speech was simply a worn-out, scratched record we in Pakistan are being made to hear ad nauseam, when the ground realities of terrorism in Pakistan struck once again. This time it was the terrifying attack against the Police Training School in Manawa, a few kilometres from the border with India at Wagah. Certainly the target’s location has a certain significance, but that seems to have been totally ignored, especially by officialdom.

However, by now it should be abundantly clear to anyone with an iota of rationality that it is not US money that will solve our indigenous terrorist problem, though such money may well line a few rulers’ pockets. Also, as Obama made clear, the money is going to come with the usual absurd conditionalities which will involve yet more US intrusion in and distortion of our domestic polity. The hard fact is that the whole issue is not about money, despite the whining of President Zardari that he has seen no dollars yet. In fact, the US and its money have become a major part of the problem of terrorism in Pakistan.

After all, when our rulers take US largesse and allow the Pakistan army to go in and kill Pakistani citizens, more space is created for violent extremists using terror as a strategy. When the Pakistani state allows its territory to be used for drones that kill Pakistanis – and it is irrelevant whether they are killed deliberately or as “collateral damage” – more space is created for future recruits who want to fight the US and its collaborators. In addition to this, when the Pakistani state is unable to establish its writ within its own territories and also unable to provide the basics of social welfare and justice to its people, space is created for those who seemingly offer these basics even if at a ruthlessly stifling price.

And when the professionalism of its security and intelligence institutions is undermined by political inductions, it is unable to undertake timely assessments of threat and evolve proactive responses. To make matters worse, once again, in the latter context, US interventions in this domain, both official and non-official, are proving to be counter-productive.

Ever since the falling out between the ISI and the CIA, the US mantra against not only the ISI but also the police and other intelligence agencies has undermined trust between these organisations, the government and the people and demoralised them to a dangerous level. The results have been before us for the last year in the terrorist attacks across the country. It may suit US long-term interests of putting our nuclear assets under their control to continue to target our security and intelligence institutions, but it is extremely harmful for Pakistan. The irony is that the “jihadis” the ISI supported, along with the CIA and the Saudis, are either long dead or too old to be active – just as their institutional handlers have left office decades ago.

There is the present reality of a new generation of militants that have evolved especially as a result of US military killings in this region post-9/11. So to blame Pakistani institutions for the failure of US military and intelligence outfits is not only irrational but also churlish, given how many Pakistani lives have been sacrificed for the United States’ misdirected strategy in this region.

So what is our terrorism issue today? We have three identifiable strands of militants who use terrorism as a strategy and all three have been compounded by a fourth type of terrorism: the state terrorism unleashed by US military attacks against our people. The first are the sub-nationalists operating primarily in Balochistan, who feed on the genuine grievances of the Baloch people – deprived of their own resources and neglected by the state. Their issues are purely political and can easily be resolved by a responsive state. But the centre’s sluggishness is allowing foreign detractors to fund, supply weapons and offer refuge to the militants, thereby aggravating the problem. The issue has become further complicated because the US, in cahoots with the terrorist outfit Jundullah, is being allowed to use the area around Juzuk and Shamsi base to destabilise Iran and to use the Bandari airfield south of Kharan to fly its drones for killing Pakistanis in FATA. To deal with this militancy, a national strategy is required focusing on provincial autonomy and economic development – and ejection of the US and other foreign presences.

The second batch of militants are the religious extremists, primarily centring on the Taliban who really came into their own post-9/11 in Pakistan. The pre-9/11 problem of sectarian violence has therefore become exacerbated as it has become enmeshed with the US military action in this region and its occupation of Afghanistan. Here the challenge to the Pakistani state lies in its inability to provide security, access to effective and quick justice and economic and political stakes to the people. As the state abdicates its role and presence, the vacuum is filled by these militants. Sending the military into FATA, instead of using the Frontier Corps, was one major strategy error but we continue to compound this by failing to revert to alternative strategies like socio-economic development and political mainstreaming through operationalising of the Political Parties Act in FATA and removal of the imperial Frontier Crimes Regulations.

This is not just an issue for the tribal areas anymore, but for the whole country, where the state machinery is becoming increasingly corrupt and ineffective. And, if the number of madrassahs are anything to go by, there is a silent but disgruntled, poverty-stricken youth that are “sleeper” Taliban. Again, in this context, the US is seen as an enemy and a major reason why militants continue to find space when the state should be focusing on space denial. External detractors also find easy prey here in terms of funding and weapons’ supplies, although funding also comes from within the country from sympathisers. It is this lot which provides suicide bombers, although the young age of most of these bombers reveals subjugation to physical brain washing rather than cause indoctrination alone. This category poses the greatest threat to the state because it is deceptive in the politico-religious alternatives it seems to be offering but to counter this group the state has to be seen to be acting in the national interest and has to provide justice and economic opportunities to all its citizens. Linkages to the US are not only counterproductive in dealing with this category of militants but provide more space for new militants.

The third group of militants now clearly arises from the growing army of the dispossessed, the poverty stricken and those who see no hope for the future. They are prepared to send their youth to die in a suicide attack if the family is provided substantive financial remuneration – the dreaded phenomenon of the suicide bomber for hire that we saw recently in Bhakkar. These marginalised people are fair game for all takers and any strategy to deal with these people has to focus on a fast track approach to poverty alleviation and again, provision of justice. It is not the US military or its grand NGO-funded designs that are needed, but the perception of a responsive state and leadership that is there for its people and that will end the brutality of the “thana-kutchery” millstone around the necks of the ordinary Pakistani citizen.

Yet again the wheat harvest looks bountiful but like the sugar barons and the wheat smugglers, all in high places, will succeed in depriving this nation of its bounties. As long as the rulers follow US and IMF diktat and make spiralling prices put basic food out of the reach of the ordinary Pakistani, militancy and violence will gain more space. Grassroots justice must move in through indigenously devised plans rather than NGO-devised solutions not grounded in Pakistani realities.

Also, if our rulers could resist trappings of grandeur, including wasteful travels abroad, the resources could be diverted to the nation. President Zardari’s ridiculous explanation of his last visit to China – that he went to buy anti-terrorism equipment – makes a mockery of this nation’s plight. How many heads of state go on such shopping sprees – which is what he made it out to be? Now, as the nation mourns its dead after Manawan, he is off again – this time to Turkey!

It is not an issue of liberals versus rightwingers, but of status quo versus change; of the rulers’ reliance on external support versus reliance on the people; of corrupt and weak institutions versus strong and responsive state structures; and, finally, of a US-centric state agenda versus a strong nationalist people-centric agenda. As history has shown, the people will always win in the end but a rational leadership can make this victory less bitter and costly.